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ABSTRACT 
Much of the information managed by government agencies is stored in databases.  
Mission Assurance objectives often require the synthesis of data from separate databases.  
Data Integration is used to address this need for combining sets of data.  However, 
because many government organizations store data in databases with different syntactic 
characteristics and at different classification levels, they will necessarily want to combine 
data from these divergent data sources.  This requires a secure system to ensure that 
sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties. 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is an experimental and extensible 
distributed Multilevel Secure (MLS) computing.  This project set out to determine if a 
data integration application could be supported by the MYSEA environment.  Through 
research on MLS database architectures, existing data integration technologies, and 
previous work to implement applications on MYSEA, this project was able to both define 
a high-level design for data fusion support in MYSEA and develop a proof-of-concept 
application to demonstrate that support. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION 
Databases have been used by business, government, and military organizations for 
years, as they provide an efficient way to organize, sort, manage, and retrieve large sets 
of data.  As more and more data is stored, there arises a need for processing data from 
several different but related data sources at one time in order to reconstruct a complete 
view of the data. 
One mechanism which has been developed to address this need is Data 
Integration [1], wherein data is retrieved from multiple data sources and automatically 
combined and condensed into a unified whole.  This has a major advantage in that the 
data is presented to the user in a combined form without the need for altering the 
structure or management of the data sources where the data is stored.  This is particularly 
attractive when one or more departments or agencies manage separate data store yet 
desire to share information.  They are justifiably reluctant to cede authority or 
management rights to some other party, but if their information can be combined and 
presented to users in a useful format, the integrated data may provide users with better 
information for a wide variety of organizational processes. 
Recently, there has been an increased call for government and military agencies to 
share information, as a way of increasing efficiency and enabling a more-complete 
picture of pertinent information [2].  Much of the information that such agencies deal 
with, however, resides at various classification levels, hence it is reasonable to conclude 
that they will necessarily want to synthesize data from several differing classification 
levels.  In the context of Mission Assurance, there is great benefit to be had by moving to 
a unified cross-domain solution which will allow for such data processing. 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is an experimental distributed 
multilevel secure computing environment. It integrates untrusted commercial off-the-
shelf components with specialized high-assurance elements [3].  In the MYSEA 
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environment, multilevel servers provide isolation between security domains while 
allowing clients access to data within each domain as allowed by the security policy.  It 
would be desirable to implement a data integration application in the MYSEA 
environment, in a way that does not compromise the security policy being enforced by 
the system. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The objective of this thesis was to determine the feasibility of data integration in 
the context of the MYSEA environment.  The thesis was to provide an answer to the 
following questions: 
1. What modifications to the existing configuration are necessary to 
successfully implement data integration support on the MYSEA server? 
2. What additional functionality is required to support the execution of data 
integration? 
Through research on existing data integration technologies, MLS database 
architectures, and previous work regarding the development of user applications on the 
MYSEA server, it was determined that data integration can be implemented in the 
MYSEA environment.  The project then set out to provide a proof-of-concept 
implementation to demonstrate the supported configuration.  This involved the creation 
of a new trusted process, an integration stub application, and a Common Gateway 
Interface (CGI) for remote execution of the stub application to retrieve results for the 
user.  Preliminary tests of the proof-of-concept implementation were also conducted. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I provides an introduction to the motivation and purpose of this 
thesis, including a brief presentation of the usefulness of data integration 
and its envisioned use in the MYSEA environment. 
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• Chapter II provides background information, including an in-depth 
explanation of data integration and a detailed discussion of the MYSEA 
environment and its pre-existing structures and processes. 
• Chapter III describes the high-level requirements and design for data 
integration support in MYSEA.  This chapter describes how a data 
integration application can be implemented in the MYSEA environment as 
a remote application, which was first described by Egan [4].  Data 
integration functionality and communication protocols to support the 
application are also described in this chapter. 
• Chapter IV describes the details of the proof-of-concept implementation of 
the data integration application along with a description of the 
development environment used for the coding of that implementation. 
• Chapter V describes the preliminary testing performed on the proof-of-
concept data integration application. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains background information on databases, data integration, the 
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA), the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, and the 
Apache-like web server used in MYSEA. 
B. DATABASES 
This section describes databases as data storage structures along with their usage 
in client-server environments and the security concerns they present in a multilevel 
environment. 
1. Overview 
A database is a data storage structure used to collect and organize information on 
similar items for easy retrieval.  Each item is represented by a record with a number of 
fields containing the data of interest.  The names and descriptions of these fields define 
the schema, or layout, of the database.  This schema can then be used to form queries for 
retrieving a set of records from the database.  There have been several languages 
developed for forming database queries [5][6][7][8], however even within the same 
language queries made for one database will not be understood by another database with 
a different schema.  That is to say, queries made for one database may be used on another 
database with the same field names and descriptions, but it is more often the case that 
such field names and descriptions vary from one database to the next.  In order to query 
multiple databases, queries in a canonical format must be translated into the proper 
schema for each data source. 
There are several models of databases which describe how the records in the 
database are structured and used.  The most prevalent models are the hierarchical 
database, where data is modeled as a tree of parent-child relationships, and the relational 
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database, which uses sets of tuples and predicate logic to organize and operate on the 
data [9].  This thesis will only address data integration architectural issues in the context 
of relational databases, the more-common of the two, though the same principles apply to 
all database types. 
2.  Client-Server Environment 
Databases often store data which is useful to different persons or is accessed by 
several applications.  In many cases, the database resides on a server which accepts 
queries from remote clients and returns the  results.  It is often convenient to have access 
to one or more databases mediated by a single database proxy server.  The database proxy 
presents an  interface to clients and allows them a simple way to access the databases it 
connects to.  The database proxy acts as a server for database clients and as a client for 
the databases themselves.  The proxy recieves queries from the database clients which it 
then relays to the databases on their behalf.  When results are returned, the proxy presents 
them to the database client as though the client had interacted directly with the database.  
This has the advantage of avoiding a direct network connection to the database.  By 
removing a direct connection to the network, the database is better protected against 
malicious users, who must now access the database through the approved, more-
constrained interfaces. 
3. Security Concerns 
As databases are repositories of information that are accessed and used by 
multiple entities, there are generally two basic types of security concerns.  The first 
concern is that an unauthorized entity could add to or change the information stored in 
the database.  The second is that some entity or group of entities might read or otherwise 
learn information they are not authorized for.   
These concerns hold for all databases in general and access controls are employed 
to ensure discretionary or role-based access rules are complied with; for example, an 
administrator may be able to add and delete records or tables whereas an ordinary user is 
only allowed to update existing records or present certain queries to the database.  When 
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the environment includes information at multiple classification levels, access controls are 
complicated by the enforcement of a mandatory access control policy, which is not 
present in other systems.  The concerns expand to include concepts of data leakage and 
signaling that are not pertinent in single-level environments.  For example, a process 
must write a query to the database in order to read data from a database.  This act of 
writing, even though its sole purpose is to read data, can create the means for a signaling 
channel between a high process and a low process.  For a database system to be secure 
such channels must be absent, thus requiring that no process can read-down or that every 
process which queries a database is a trusted process. 
There are other broader issues associated with data retrieval in MLS systems and 
in databases more generally, such as aggregation and inference which leads to the user 
having information to which authorization to access may not have been provided [10].  
Because of the complex nature of these problems and the difficulties of solving them with 
any kind of architectural mechanism, aggregation and inference lie outside the scope of 
this thesis. 
C. DATA INTEGRATION 
1. Problem Space 
Databases can be useful for storing and organizing related bits of information in a 
way that makes the information easy to retrieve.  However, this is complicated when a 
given task or problem requires access to multiple sets of data housed in separate 
databases, with different schema, that are managed by different entities and that may have 
over-lapping or contradictory information.  It is necessary to retrieve the data from the 
various sources and compile it in such a way as to provide a single set of data without 
overlap or internal contradictions.  Data integration is a method for addressing this 
complication. 
It is important to note that the databases to be used by the data integration 
application are not necessarily under the control of a single department or agency nor are 
they necessarily within the same organization as the integration application.  The 
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information is shared between departments and agencies, but control over the content and 
maintenance of the databases is not ceded.  This disqualifies possible solutions of 
reorganizing or restructuring data in the databases and requires that the data integration 
application adjust to the databases it relies upon. 
2. Conceptual Operation 
The intention behind data integration is to take a single query from the user and 
retrieve data from multiple sources based on that query.  This data is stored in different 
forms and under different schemata, and managed by separate departments or agencies.  
The data integration application will itself have its own schema through which queries 
must be translated to the schemata of the different databases from which data is retrieved.  
The data integration application acts much like a regular database proxy in that it receives 
queries from a user and then acts as a client in order to retrieve information from several 
data sources; however there are a few differences.   
The most apparent difference is that the data integration application must be able 
to handle data stored under multiple schemata; although there are database proxy servers 
which manage collections of physical databases, these all share the same schema.  
Additionally, unlike a regular proxy the data integration application must handle data that 
may overlap or be contradictory; the application will have to have some set of rules to 
account for this and produce unified results.  Finally, it is notable that while a regular 
proxy might be a general application and allow for adding and modifying data, the data 
integration application is only designed to retrieve and coalesce data.  The operation of 
the integration application is to accept a query, retrieve data from each data source, 
process the data to resolve conflicts or overlaps, and finally return the results to the client. 
3. Security Concerns 
Since the data integration application acts much like a database proxy the 
concerns are much the same.  However as the data integration application does not update 
or add data to the database the concerns of the integration application are only a subset of 
the concerns of database proxies in general.  The major concern is that of data leakage, 
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where entities may learn or read data for which they do not have authorization.  This 
concern covers such threats as covert channels and weak configurations or software 
exploits that would allow privileged information or queries to be processed and returned.  
There is some additional concern over the integrity of the data returned by the 
application.  Since part of the integration application’s function is to alter the data it 
receives in order to deal with overlaps and contradictions in the data sources, the data 
returned from the integration application can never be of higher integrity than the 
application itself [11]. That is, although the data integration application retrieves 
information from outside sources which may have high integrity, the function of the 
application is to manipulate that data and so everything that the client receives effectively 
originates with the integration application.  If the integration application can only be 
relied on to produce data at a certain integrity level, all of its results must be regarded no 
higher than that level, regardless of the integrity level of the source.  Necessarily, if the 
data integration application retrieves data from a source of lower integrity, the results of 
the integration must be regarded as no higher than that lower level. 
D. THE MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
1. Overview 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is a distributed multilevel secure 
(MLS) networking environment designed to provide enforcement of mandatory security 
policies.  The system consists of a small number of high-assurance components which 
enforce the mandatory policy combined with COTS products which provide the 
productivity applications required by the users.  In addition to the  MYSEA clients, TPE, 
and MLS Server, described below, the architecture can also support and service legacy 
single-level networks through specific ports from the Network Interface Card (NIC) 
through the use of a Trusted Communication Module, one of the high-assurance 




Figure 1.   The MYSEA Testbed 
 
2. MYSEA Server 
MYSEA server is a high-assurance system, currently running on the BAE XTS-
400 Trusted Computing System using the BAE Secure Trusted Operating System 
(STOP). STOP provides the enforcment of mandatory access controls that comply with 
the rules of the Bell-LaPadula model [12] for secrecy and the rules for the Biba model 
[13] for information integrity. This high-assurance server works in conjunction with 
untrusted commercial application protocol servers to provide services to the MYSEA 
clients. 
A key component of the high-assurance MYSEA server is the Secure Session 
Server (SSS).  When a client requests a service from the MYSEA server, if that service is 
one of the allowed services supplied by the MYSEA server, the SSS determines the 
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application server processes running at the same security level as the requesting client.  
These untrusted processes then handle the requests of the user. 
3. MYSEA Client 
A MYSEA client is composed of a COTS personal computer and a Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE).  The latter is juxtaposed between the client machine and the LAN and 
facilitates a secure, unforgable authentication with the MYSEA servers via a trusted path.  
This allows the user to login to the MYSEA servers and set the security level of the 
current session.  The client machine runs commercial operating systems and application 
software familiar to users as the motivation is that "unless  a secure system offers users 
comfortable and familiar interfaces for handling routine information, it will fail due to 
lack of user acceptability" [3]. 
The client machines are thin, stateless machines in order to address the issue of 
object reuse, i.e., the possibility of residual data remaining in memory between sessions.  
The client machines load their operating system and various applications from read-only 
disks or from the MYSEA server into volatile memory; this memory is purged when a 
user logs out or changes session level.  Such a configuration allows for the use of COTS 
applications, providing familiar tools to the user and simplicity in purchacing  end-user 
applications. 
4. Trusted Path Extension 
The Trusted Path Extension (TPE) is a trusted physical device that is juxtaposed 
between the MYSEA client machine and the MYSEA network.  It is physically and 
logically associated with the client and is responsible for providing a secure, unforgeable 
connection with the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the MYSEA server.  The TPE 
facilitates user login and authentication and supports setting the security level of the 
session.  Without this authentication, a client can not connect to the MYSEA network. 
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5. Trusted Remote Session Server 
Because MYSEA clients are thin, stateless machines, it becomes necessary to 
have a mechanism for providing server-resident client applications (RAs).  The Trusted 
Remote Session Server is the trusted component of MYSEA that manages requests for 
RAs and manages communications between the RA and the client.  The MYSEA server 
creates a new TRSS process for each established session and the TRSS manages all RAs 
for the TPE associated with that session. 
There are two major motivations for the TRSS.  First, the XTS-400 on which the 
MYSEA server is built only allows trusted applications or applications running as the 
network user to access network ports.  Because the remote applications requested by the 
client must run at the security level associated with the client it is necessary to have a 
trusted process to provide access to the network ports.  Additionally, the TRSS manages 
communications on a message-by-message basis to ensure that the RA only makes 
connections to peers at the same session level [14]. 
When such an untrusted remote application requires network access, it signals to 
the TRSS parent.  The TRSS parent then spawns a child to handle network 
communications on behalf of the RA.  When the RA requests a connection to some peer, 
the TRSS child looks the peer up in the Peer Level Database, a static database which 
indicates the level of different peer machines.  A connection is then allowed or denied 
based on the level of the RA and the level of the peer.  When all of the RA's sockets have 
been closed, or a terminate signal is received from the TRSS parent, the TRSS child 
terminates the RA. 
E.  HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL 
The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a client/server application protocol 
which runs on top of the standard TCP/IP connection-oriented network protocol [15].  
HTTP has been widely used over the Internet in support of the World Wide Web and has 
been one of the most used protocols on the Internet.  The HTTP protocol defines 
messages which can be sent between a client and a server in order to request and transfer 
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data; in most cases the client is a web browser and the data requested can be text, images, 
audio files, or any other data which might be sent over the Internet. 
F.  APACHE WEB SERVER 
This section describes the Apache server followed by a description of the Apache-
like httpd which is in use on the MYSEA server.  The Apache Project an open-source 
project which has developed and maintains the popular Apache Web Server.  The 
Apache-like httpd was adapted from a standard Apache Web Server for operation on the 
MYSEA server by Bersack [16]. 
1.  Standard Apache 
The Apache HTTP server project is a "collaborative software development effort 
aimed at creating a robust, commercial-grade, featureful, and freely-available source code 
implementation of an HTTP (Web) server" [17].  The project is managed by volunteers 
around the world, and accepts contributions of code and documentation from its user 
community.  In 2007, a survey found that over 50% of web pages were served by the 
Apache Web Server, making it the most widely-used web server by a large margin [18]. 
The main appeal of the Apache server is its flexibility and ease of adaptation.  As 
an open-source project, the source code is readily available to developers allowing for in-
house modifications of the compiled system [19].  In addition to this, the server is 
designed to be extensible through custom-made modules, many of which are also freely 
available along with the Apache server code.  To use a module, all that is required is that 
the module be compiled and the Apache configuration file modified to include it when 
the server is started. 
In a typical environment, the Apache server runs as a daemon process.  It accepts 
incoming HTTP requests and spawns child processes to handle each connection.  This 
allows the parent process to continue listening for other incoming connections while the 
child processes service the requests that have already been received. 
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2.  Apache Adaptation for MYSEA 
An Apache-like web server was chosen for use in MYSEA because of the 
flexibility of use and modification noted above.  Because of the security constraints on 
the MYSEA server, it was necessary to have a web server that could be modified to fit 
certain needs.  In particular, the server would have to be invoked by the trusted SSS child 
process when a client made a request for HTTP services.  This is because the MYSEA 
server does not allow untrusted processes access to network ports, and the web server 
would have to run as the user ID and session level of the requesting client to maintain 
access control policies on the different web documents.  Communications between the 
client and the Apache-like server flows through the SSS child via a "pseudo socket" 
mechanism implemented for the purpose of supporting network communications from 
untrusted processes.  Because of this, the web server needed to be a stand-alone 
application that handled requests directly rather than spawn child processes to do so, it 
needed to be activated by another application, and it needed to communicate using 
pseudo-sockets rather than directly to network sockets.  All of these requirements were 
met through modification of the configuration file and altering the Apache source code 
[16].  The most important aspect of this design is that the Apache-like server runs at the 
session level of the client and is allowed read-down permissions, in accordance with the 
mandatory security policy, allowing a user logged in at a higher security level to view 




III. REQUIREMENTS AND DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
To implement data integration where the data to be integrated has several 
classification levels, it is necessary to ensure that communications and functions can be 
performed without compromising the mandatory security policy.  That is, the application 
will be invoked by the user, and thus it should run at the user's current session level.  
However, the application will need access to data sources dominated by the user’s session 
level, which presents concern regarding write-down operations by the application.  The 
application must also work within the constraints of the secure operating system, i.e., 
STOP, that the MYSEA server runs on.  Hence there are security issues associated with 
the communications necessary for the data integration application to perform it's 
function. 
This chapter describes a high-level design that utilizes the existing MYSEA 
Remote Application support to demonstrate support for data integration in the MYSEA 
architecture.  Because of the concerns and constraints noted above, a decomposition of 
data integration functionalities was identified that allowed for MLS data access while 
minimizing the amount of trusted code introduced to the system.  This decomposition 
results in two new processes: the trusted Database Proxy Server (DBPS) daemon and the 
untrusted Integration Stub Application (ISA).  This chapter presents a design for both the 
‘end goal’ data integration application and for a proof of concept application which was 
implemented for this project.  This work builds upon existing MYSEA support for 
Remote Applications, which was discussed by Cooper [14] and Egan [4]. 
B. TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
The design for the prototype application involved decomposing the conceptual 
operation of data integration in order to separate out the functions which require special 
privileges from those which can be untrusted.  It was determined that separating the 
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functions of a database proxy from those required for data integration would result in the 
trusted code required to access data sources at different security levels, whereas the rest 
of the application may run untrusted as a remote application at the session level of the 
user. 
The trusted database proxy has the following requirements: 
• The proxy shall accept data requests from a remote application. 
• The proxy shall verify the security level of the remote application prior to 
granting access to the data sources. 
• The proxy shall be able to interface with a heterogeneous set of backend 
data sources. 
• The proxy shall query appropriate data sources based on the security level 
of the remote application. 
• The proxy shall have read and write access to data sources of differing 
security levels. 
• The proxy shall mark each of the results with labels appropriate to the 
security level of the data source queried. 
• The proxy shall keep a log of all requests. 
The untrusted application code has the following requirements: 
• The application shall run with the user ID and current session level of the 
authenticated user. 
• The application shall be launched by the client. 
• The application shall process results received from the trusted proxy and 
integrate the data to return to the user. 
C. HIGH LEVEL DESIGN 
1. Overview 
MYSEA support for Remote Applications has been discussed previously [14] [4] 
and the same concepts and existing processes can serve many of the needs of data 
integration support.  However, as the data integration application must access data 
sources at multiple sensitivity levels and standard remote applications run with the user 
ID and  at the current session level of the user, data integration support requires the 
  17
addition of a new trusted process family, the Database Proxy Server (DBPS), to process 
requests to the data sources and to return the results to the untrusted application code.  
Figure 1 presents an overview of this architecture. The steps in a data integration request 
will now be described. 
 
Figure 2.   Process Overview (after [4]) 
At start up, both the Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent and  the Secure System 
Daemon (SSD) are launched as system daemons.  The SSD launches a Secure Session 
Server (SSS) Parent process for each of the allowed protocols supported by the MYSEA 
server.  The TPS Parent accepts login requests from remote clients and spawns a TPS 
Child to handle trusted path communications for each client.  When a user successfully 
authenticates, the TPS Child launches a Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent 
process to manage remote application requests for that user.  The SSD, SSS, TPS, and 
TRSS processes are all trusted processes with access to the MLS network interface. 
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An authenticated user may open a web browser and request a page which will 
serve as an interface to the remote application.  The SSS Child process that manages the 
HTTP protocol for the user receives the web page and spawns an untrusted httpd process 
with the user ID and at the current session level of the requesting user.  This is the 
modified Apache-like application discussed in the previous chapter.  Because the httpd 
process is untrusted, all network communications are mediated by the SSS Child process 
that spawned it.  The user will select the link on the requested webpage for the remote 
application service and the httpd process will launch a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) 
script which will launch the requested remote application.  This is the standard operation 
of a Remote Application as described in [4].  For data integration, the Integration Stub 
Application (ISA) will be launched as the remote application. 
The design of the data integration system required the addition of another trusted 
process family, the Database Proxy Server (DBPS).  The DBPS is run as a system 
daemon, i.e., is started during system start up, and is permitted to access the MLS 
network interface.  After the ISA is launched, it first requests a MYSEA socket from the 
TRSS Parent  and uses that socket to communicate with the DBPS Parent.  The TRSS 
Parent spawns a TRSS Child to mediate communications for the ISA through the 
MYSEA socket mechanism.  The ISA then makes a connection to the DBPS Parent 
which will verify the session level of the ISA and spawn a DBPS Child to query the 
appropriate data sources.  The DBPS Child consolidates the results, returns them as a unit 
to the ISA, and closes the connection, at which point the ISA completes its data retrieval 
task.  The ISA “integrates” the data and returns the integrated results via the httpd 
process.  Through this request process, the httpd, CGI, and ISA are single-level processes 
with the user ID and current session level of the requesting user; the TRSS and DBPS 
processes  are trusted processes. 
The processes involved in the data integration communications are described in 
the following sections.  The processes involved in general remote application operation 
have been described in [4] but are presented here in order to fully describe the context in 
which the data integration application operates.  The processes which were developed for 
this project are the DBPS Parent and Child and the ISA. 
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2. Processes 
a. Trusted Path Server (TPS) Parent 
The Trusted Path Server Parent is a system daemon that runs at the startup 
of the MYSEA server.  The TPS Parent is responsible for accepting trusted path session 
requests from TPEs, validating that the TPE is allowed to connect to the MYSEA server, 
and if the TPE is validated spawning a TPS Child process to handle the request.  When a 
trusted path session request is received, the TPS Parent checks for the requesting TPE's 
identifier in the Allowed TPE Database.  If the identifier is found, then a child process is 
spawned to handle the trusted path communications with that TPE; otherwise, the 
connection is dropped.  The TPS Parent then continues to accept and validate session 
requests from other TPEs [4]. 
The TPS Parent accesses the MLS LAN and so runs at the level of the 
MLS LAN.  Since it must write to system-low databases it is designated as a trusted 
process [4]. 
b. Trusted Path Server (TPS) Child 
The TPS Child process is spawned by the TPS Parent process once a TPE 
has been validated, and the child process handles all of the trusted path session 
communications for that TPE.  This includes requests to log in, set the session level, run 
the session, and log out.  The TPS Child is also responsible for launching the TRSS 
Parent process, which will manage remote application requests for the client.  When the 
TPS Child receives data from the client, which begins with a Secure Attention Request 
Packet (SARP), it reads and processes the client’s command and returns the output before 
waiting to receive the next command [4]. 
The TPS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN and is designated at a 
trusted process because it requires access to system-low databases as well as the system's 
user identification and authentication information [4]. 
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c. Secure Session Daemon (SSD) 
The Secure Session Daemon is a system daemon that runs at the startup of 
the MYSEA server.  It is responsible for spawning SSS Parent processes for each of the 
protocols the server supports, as listed in the Allowed Protocols Database.  For each of 
these protocols (e.g. HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, etc.), it spawns an SSS Parent process to 
handle requests for service using that protocol [4]. 
The SSD process terminates either when all of its spawned processes 
terminate or when it is interrupted by a local Secure Attention Key (SAK).  In this second 
case, the SSD is responsible for signaling each of its SSS Parent processes to terminate as 
well.  The SSS Parent processes require privileged ports requiring them to run as the 
network user, and so the SSD must also run as the network user in order to spawn and 
terminate them.  This requires that the SSD be designated as a trusted process [4]. 
d. Secure Session Server (SSS) Parent 
The Secure Session Server Parent processes are spawned by the SSD, and 
each is responsible for accepting and validating requests for a specific allowed protocol.  
When a service request is received by the SSS Parent, it first checks to see if the 
requesting client has an established session by searching for a matching entry in the User 
Database.  If no such entry is found, the SSS Parent checks for a valid remote application 
connection in the Remote Connections Database.  If the request is associated with either 
an established trusted session or a remote application connection, then an SSS Child 
process is spawned to handle the request; if not, the connection is dropped.  The SSS 
Parent then continues to accept and validate other requests [4]. 
The SSS Parent runs at the level of the MLS LAN, but must also switch to 
the network user in order to access privileged ports.  Additionally, it must spawn children 
with MAC and DAC exemptions and the ability to change user IDs, which requires the 
Parent to have such privileges.  Therefore, it is designated as a trusted process [4]. 
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e. Secure Session Server (SSS) Child 
The Secure Session Server Child handles all of the service requests for a 
certain protocol from a specific user or remote application.  It is responsible for launching 
the appropriate Application Protocol Server (APS), which runs at the session level of the 
given TPE or remote application.  Since the APS is untrusted it does not have access to 
the MLS interface and must rely on the SSS Child that spawned it to make socket calls on 
its behalf.  Communications between the APS and the SSS Child are handles through a 
MYSEA socket (MSKT) allocated by the TPS Child process.  When the APS requires a 
socket call, it enters its request into the MSKT database and signals the SSS Child; the 
SSS Child retrieves the request from the database, makes  the  requested  call, and  enters 
the return code and any retrieved data into the database.  The SSS Child then signals the 
APS, which retrieves the results from the database [4].  The MYSEA socket interface is 
such that these functions appear to the APS to be ordinary socket calls. 
Each time the APS requests a connection to a peer (using the connect, 
sendto, accept, or receivefrom socket calls), the SSS Child must verify that the 
connection is allowed by comparing the session level of the peer with that of the APS.  
The current session level of the peer is retrieved by consulting the Peer Level and User 
Databases.  If the connection is allowed, the SSS Child consults the Source Address 
Binding Database to determine the source address that is configured for use with the 
supplied destination before making the connection.  Each time a new connection is 
established on behalf of an APS, the SSS Child updates the Remote Connections 
Database with the security level of the new connection; when the connection is closed, 
the SSS Child removes the entry from the database [4]. 
The SSS Child must run at the level of the MLS LAN, but it is also 
required to communicate with the APS, which runs at the session level of the remote 
user, and it must change it's user ID in order to launch the APS process and initialize the 
MSKT database with the proper user ID.  Therefore, the SSS Child is designated as a 
trusted process. [4] 
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f. Application Protocol Server (APS) 
The Application Protocol Server is the untrusted process which handles 
the server side of client/server communications.  For the purposes of this project this is 
the Apache-like httpd which was described in [16] and discussed in the previous chapter.  
The httpd has been modified in order to use the MSKT interface so that it can access the 
MLS LAN through the SSS Child [4]. 
The httpd (as is each APS process) is an untrusted process that runs with 
the user ID and session level of the requesting user [4]. 
g. CGI Remote Application Invocation 
The CGI remote application invocation process is initiated by the httpd in 
response to the user's request to launch an RA from the web interface.  The process is 
spawned by the httpd and is responsible for invoking the RA and packaging the results to 
be returned to the user by the httpd.  This is the process that will invoke the Integration 
Stub Application.  It is an untrusted process which runs with the user ID and session level 
of the httpd, which is itself running as the user and session level of the requesting user 
[4]. 
h. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Parent 
The TRSS Parent process is launched by the TPS Child process once a 
user has been authenticated.  The TRSS parent is responsible for managing requests from 
remote applications associated with the authenticated user.  Specifically, the TRSS Parent 
spawns a TRSS Child process for each RA that requests the use of MYSEA sockets [4]. 
The TRSS Parent initializes by attaching to the databases it requires for its 
open operation as well as the databases which will be required by its children.  When the 
TRSS Parents process receives a signal from an untrusted process, it searches the MSKT 
Database for an entry with the call type of new socket call and spawns a TRSS Child 
process to handle the request for a new socket and all future socket requests from that 
remote application.  The TRSS Parent then sets the trusted PID field in the MSKT 
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Database entry to the process ID of the newly spawned child and then returns to waiting 
to be signaled by other remote applications [4]. 
The TRSS Parent itself does not access the MLS LAN but the children it 
spawns do, therefore the TRSS Parent must run at the level of the MLS LAN.  However, 
the TRSS Parent must switch to the level and ID of the user requesting remote 
application services before it initializes the MSKT Database so that the RAs, which run at 
the user's session and ID level, will be able to read and write to the database.  
Additionally, the TRSS Parent must receive signals from the RAs which are running at 
the user's level.  Because of these requirements, the TRSS Parent is designated as a 
trusted process [4]. 
i. Trusted Remote Session Server (TRSS) Child 
The TRSS Child is spawned by the TRSS Parent to handle socket calls on 
behalf of a particular remote application.  Communications by untrusted processes which 
require socket calls are done through a MYSEA socket (MSKT) allocated by the TPS 
Child process.  After the initial call has been received by the TRSS Parent and the TRSS 
Child has been initiated, whenever the RA requires access to the MLS interface it enters 
its request into the MSKT Database and signals the TRSS Child.  The TRSS Child 
retrieves the requested call from the database and makes the appropriate socket call, 
entering the return value and any retrieved data into the database, then signals the RA.  
The RA then retrieves the results from the database [4]. 
Each time the RA requests a connection to a peer (using the connect, 
sendto, accept, or receivefrom socket calls), the TRSS Child must verify that the 
connection is allowed by comparing the session level of the peer with that of the RA.  
The current session level of the peer is retrieved by consulting the Peer Level and User 
Databases.  If the connection is allowed, the SSS Child consults the Source Address 
Binding Database to determine the source address that is configured for use with the 
supplied destination before making the connection.  Each time a new connection is 
established on behalf of an RA, the TRSS Child updates the Remote Connections 
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Database with the security level of the new connection; when the connection is closed, 
the TRSS Child removes the entry from the database [4]. 
The TRSS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN.  It also requires access 
to privileged ports, and must communicate with the RA process which runs at the session 
level of the user which invoked it.  Therefore, the TRSS Child is designated as a trusted 
process [4]. 
j. Integration Stub Application (ISA) 
The Integration Stub Application (ISA) is one of the new processes 
implemented for this project.  The ISA is the component of the data integration 
application which can run as untrusted code.  This includes functions regarding accepting 
user input, performing the actual integration of the data, and returning results to the user.  
Because data integration requires access to multiple data sources and which may have 
different security levels, it is necessary to have a trusted process for such functions.  
Therefore, the ISA relies upon the trusted Database Proxy Server (DBPS) for access to 
the data sources. 
The ISA itself behaves in much the same way as other remote applications 
already supported by MYSEA.  It is invoked by a CGI script which is launched by the 
httpd in response to a user's request.  The ISA is untrusted and runs at the session level of 
the requesting user.  Communications with the DBPS are done through the MYSEA 
socket interface, mediated by the TRSS processes.  This is a useful design in that it would 
allow the ISA and DBPS to reside on separate servers in a federated environment. The 
communications between the ISA and the DBPS are described in Section 4 below. 
When the ISA is launched, it makes a request to the TRSS Parent for a 
new socket, and then requests a connection with the DBPS.  The ISA sends a request for 
data based on parameters provided by the user to the DBPS, processes the returned data 
based on its integration algorithm, and returns the results to the user. 
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k. Database Proxy Server (DBPS) Parent 
The Database Proxy Server (DBPS) Parent is a new process implemented 
for this project.  To support multilevel data integration, it was necessary for an 
application to have access to data sources which would have different security levels 
associated with them.  Although data integration only requires data to be retrieved from 
the database, rather than adding or manipulating data in the data source itself, the act of 
requesting data constitutes a write and could be used to covertly transmit information 
from high to low security levels.  Therefore, processes that retrieve data from the data 
sources must be trusted.  In order to minimize the amount of trusted code introduced into 
the system, the only function of the DBPS is to retrieve data from the data sources on 
behalf of the ISAs. 
The DBPS Parent is responsible for accepting and validating connection 
requests from ISAs.  When a connection request is received, the DBPS Parent searches 
the Remote Connection Database for an entry associated with the requesting ISA.  If 
there is no such entry, the connection is dropped.  If an entry is found, the DBPS spawns 
a DBPS Child to handle the requests from that ISA, passing that child the session level 
information of the ISA, and then returns to listening for other connection requests.  These 
communications are described in Section 4 below. 
The DBPS Parents runs at the level of the MLS LAN and needs no special 
permissions to read data from the Remote Connection Database.  However the children it 
spawns must have access to data sources at multiple levels as well as communicate with 
an ISA running at the session level of the user requesting service.  Therefore the DBPS 
Parent is designated as a trusted process. 
l. Database Proxy Server (DBPS) Child 
The DBPS Child is spawned by the DBPS Parent to handle requests from 
a particular ISA.  Once the connection between the DBPS Child and the ISA is 
established, the DBPS Child receives query information from the ISA.  The DBPS Child 
then makes queries to the data sources it is connected to with security levels equal to or 
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less than that of the requesting ISA.  The DBPS Child informs the ISA of the amount of 
data that was retrieved and then returns the results. 
The DBPS Child acts as both a database server for the ISA and as a 
database client for the external data sources; this is precisely the definition of a database 
proxy.  The communications between the DBPS Child and the ISA, and between the 
DBPS Child and the external data sources, are described in Section 4 below. 
The DBPS Child runs at the level of the MLS LAN, but is required to send 
queries to data sources of different security levels, as well as communicate to an ISA 
running at the session level of the requesting user.  Therefore the DBPS Child is 
designated as a trusted process. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the processes involved in executing the 




Launched By Instances 
TPS Parent Yes MLS LAN 
(System 
Daemon) 
One per system 
TPS Child Yes MLS LAN TPS Parent One per TPE 
SSD Yes MLS LAN 
(System 
Daemon) 
One per system 
SSS Parent Yes MLS LAN SSD One per Allowed Protocol 
SSS Child Yes MLS LAN SSS Parent 
One per APS-Client 
connection 
APS (httpd) No 
Remote 
User 











Launched By Instances 
TRSS Parent Yes MLS LAN TPS Child 
One per user per session 
level 
TRSS Child Yes MLS LAN TRSS Parent One per remote application 
DBPS Parent Yes MLS LAN 
(System 
Daemon) 
One per system 




CGI Invocation One per user request 
Table 1.   Process Attributes (after [4]) 
 
Table 2 summarizes the privileges required by each trusted process. 
Trusted Process Privileges Required 
TPS Parent • Ability to access the MLS LAN as well as system-low databases. 
TPS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN as well as system-low databases. 
• Ability to access user identification and authentication 
information. 
SSD • Ability to create and terminate child processes that run as the 
network user. 
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Trusted Process Privileges Required 
SSS Parent • Ability to run as the network user in order to access privileged 
ports. 
• Ability to create child processes that can access the MLS LAN 
and also communicate with user-level RA processes. 
• Ability to create child processes that can switch user IDs. 
SSS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN and also communicate with 
user-level APS processes. 
• Ability to switch to the user ID of the remote user before 
initializing the MSKT Database and launching the APS process. 
TRSS Parent • Ability to switch to the user ID of the remote user before 
initializing the MSKT Database. 
• Ability to create child processes with access to the MLS LAN 
and also communicate with user-level RA processes. 
• Ability to create and terminate child processes that run as the 
network user. 
• Ability to be launched by low-integrity processes (refer to [4] for 
details). 
TRSS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN and also communicate with 
user-level RA processes. 
• Ability to run as the network user in order to access privileged 
ports. 
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Trusted Process Privileges Required 
DBPS Parent • Ability to create child processes that can access the MLS LAN 
and communicate with system-low databases. 
• Ability to create child processes that can access databases of 
different security levels. 
DBPS Child • Ability to access the MLS LAN and communicate with system-
low databases. 
• Ability to access databases of different security levels. 
Table 2.   Privilege Requirements of Trusted Processes (after [4]) 
3.  Databases 
a. Remote Connection Database 
The Remote Connection Database is a database that is used to bind 
connections from an RA or APS to a specific user and session level.  There is one 
Remote Connection Database per system; it is initialized by the TPS Parent and is 
updated by an individual TRSS Child or SSS Child each time their associated RA or APS 
establishes or terminates a connection.  Each entry consists of a source port, source IP 
address, destination port, and destination IP address, along with session information [4]. 
The Remote Connection Database is used by the DBPS Parent to verify 
that a connection request is coming from an ISA associated with a valid user session.  
Entries in the Remote Connection Database include information on the source port, 
source IP address, destination port, and destination IP address; these values uniquely 
identify a socket.  If an entry is found matching the socket being used by the ISA, session 
data is retrieved and passed to a DBPS Child which will handle the connection; 
otherwise, the connection is dropped [4]. 
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b. Peer Level Database 
The Peer Level Database is a database used to indicate whether or not a 
peer is multilevel and, if not, to associate the peer IP address with a specific security 
level.  There is a single, static Peer Level Database system [4]. 
The database is used by the TRSS Child and SSS Child to determine if a 
given connection request is allowable.  When an RA or APS requests a connection to a 
peer, the TRSS Child or SSS Child looks up the peer in the Peer Level Database and 
retrieves the security information for that peer.  If the peer is multilevel or at the same 
security level as the requesting process then the connection is allowed, otherwise it is 
dropped.  Since the ISA functions as an RA, there must be an entry in the database to 
indicate that the DBPS is a multilevel peer [4]. 
c. Source Address Binding Database 
The Source Address Binding Database is a static, per-system database 
used to associate one or more destination IP addresses with a source IP address.  Because 
of the way the SSS Parent recognizes and handles incoming traffic, the connection must 
be registered by the TRSS process with a known source port, source IP address, 
destination port, and destination IP address.  This becomes a problem for certain socket 
calls that do not bind to a source IP address before attempting to establish a remote 
connection.  A TRSS Child may account for this problem by consulting the Source 
Address Binding Database to find an appropriate source IP address for a given 
destination IP address [4]. 
Since the ISA relied on the TRSS Child to process its socket calls, and 
since the ISA must make a connection to the DBPS, there must be an entry in this table to 





4.  Communication Protocols 
a. Overview 
To initiate a data integration request the user fills out and submits an 
HTML form on the web page for the data integration remote application.  Submitting the 
form launches the CGI Invocation process which in turn launches the ISA process, 
passing the form inputs as key-value pairs in command-line arguments.  These command 
–line arguments are accepted by the ISA as string values.  The ISA makes a connection 
with the DBPS Parent which, if the ISA is associated with a valid user session, spawns a 
DBPS Child to handle the ISA’s request.  The ISA sends the key-value pairs to the DBPS 
Child and the DBPS Child uses these pairs and the session-level information it received 
from its parent to retrieve data that is dominated by the ISA’s session level.  Once the 
DBPS Child has made all of its queries, it packages the results into a single data structure 
to be returned to the ISA.  The ISA parses the returned structure, integrates the results it 
contains, and returns these integrated results to the user via the CGI script. 
The nature of the communications required between the ISA and the 
DBPS lend themselves toward a connection-oriented strategy.  For this reason it was 
decided that the communications should be made on top of TCP/IP, rather than through a 
UDP protocol or some other method.  The use of TCP/IP allows the communications to 
be discussed as a series of messages.  Additionally, the management of the connection, 
the set-up and tear-down before and after communications is offloaded to standard socket 
function calls. 
Figure 3 shows the message flow of the protocol between the DBPS and 
the ISA, after a TCP connection has been established.  
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Figure 3.   Message Flow Between DBPS and ISA 
Header information is required for the messages sent between the DBPS 
and the ISA.  This header consists of the protocol version being used, the message type, 
and the size of the payload.  This general information is necessary to coordinate 
communications between the DBPS and the ISA.  The version field is 8 bits long, as is 
the message type field which denotes either “Request Setup,” “Request Parameters,” 
“Response Setup” or “Response Results.”  The last header field is a 16-bit field which 
holds the size of the payload.  Following this header information is the message payload.  
Figure 4 shows this generic packet format.  For the Request Setup and Request Setup the 
payload is a simple 32-bit integer indicating the total size in words (including header 
information) of the following message, either a Request Parameters or Response Results.  
This size information is then used by the recipient to dynamically allocate and 
appropriate-sized buffer to hold the incoming data.  In this way both the DBPS and ISA 
expect a message of known size (64 bits total for the header and payload) which will 
establish the size of the variable-length message that is to follow and thereby avoid buffer 
overflows.  Figure 5 shows the packet format used for the Request Setup message and 
Figure 6 shows the format for the Response Setup message.  In a Request Parameters or 







containing either null-terminated strings or a results unit composed of security labels and 
database result sets.  The form of these parameter and result payloads is described in the 
ISA and DBPS Child sections below. 
 
Figure 4.   Generic Message Format for DBPS-ISA Protocol 
 
Figure 5.   Message Format for Request Setup 
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Figure 6.   Message Format for Response Setup 
 
b. CGI Invocation 
The CGI Invocation script is launched by the httpd process when the user 
submits a request to invoke the ISA.  The script uses the Perl ‘backtick’ operation to 
launch the ISA as a command-line application.  The key-value pairs that were entered 
into the HTML form are passed to the CGI script when it is called by the httpd, and are 
used as command-line arguments to the ISA.  The backtick operation also allows the Perl 
script to capture the standard output of the invoked application; this is how the CGI script 
receives results from the ISA, and those results are then returned to the user as part of a 
web page via the httpd process. 
c. ISA 
The ISA is invoked by the CGI script with the IP address of the DBPS and 
the key-value pairs that were input by the user as command-line arguments.  These 
arguments are then stored in internal variables as string values.  The ISA initiates a 
connection with the DBPS, through the mediation of the TRSS processes and the 
MYSEA socket interface.  If the ISA is associated with a valid user session then a DBPS 
Child is spawned and the connection is completed; otherwise the connection is dropped.  
Once the connection is completed, the ISA sends a Request Setup message followed by a 
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Request Parameters message that includes the number of pairs and the key-value pairs, 
which are presented as a series of null-terminated strings, to the DBPS Child.  The 
number of pairs is a 32-bit numerical value.  The strings are arranged alternating key with 
value so that the value of a given key is the string following it.  The Request Parameters 
message is a variable-length message and takes advantage of the connection-based nature 
of TCP/IP to ensure that the entire message is transferred and that the DBPS Child knows 
when the message has been received.  Figure 7 shows this message format. 
 
Figure 7.   Request Parameters Format 
 














The ISA then waits to receive the Response Setup and Response Results 
messages from the DBPS Child and, once they have been received, the ISA closes the 
connection.  Included in the Response Results message are the size and security label for 
each result set returned by the DBPS.  The form of this unit is described in the DBPS 
Child section below.  The ISA uses the size information to allocate the appropriate 
amount of space to store each result set. 
The ISA parses the data structure into its individual result sets in order to 
perform the integration function.  The results of the integration are then printed to 
standard out, to be captured by the CGI script and returned to the user. 
d. DBPS Parent 
The DBPS receives a connection request from the ISA and immediately 
looks up the socket associated with the connection in the Remote Connection Database.  
The socket is identified by a four-value set of source IP, source port, destination IP, and 
destination port [4].  If the socket is found in the table then the ISA is associated with a 
valid user session and session-level information is retrieved for that ISA; otherwise the 
connection is dropped.  Once session level information has been found for the connection 
it is stored in an internal variable and the DBPS creates a child process through the use of 
fork( ); as a result of the fork( ), the child inherits the connection to the ISA and the 
session-level information and continues execution from that line of code.  The DBPS 
Parent then returns to listening for requests from other ISAs. 
e. DBPS Child 
The DBPS Child inherits the connection and session-level information 
from the DBPS Parent as internal variable when it is created by the use of fork( ).  The 
first thing the DBPS Child does upon creation is wait to receive the Request Setup and 
Request Parameters messages from the ISA.  The Request Parameters message contains 
the key-value pairs used for the database queries the DBPS Child is to make.  These 
parameters are sent as a TCP/IP message in the form of a comma-delimited string of key-
value pairs (see Figure 5 above).  Once the pairs have been received, the DBPS Child 
  37
makes its queries.  The session-level information is checked against a series of string 
comparisons to determine which set of data bases are dominated by the ISA’s session 
level; once this is determined, the DBPS Child constructs SQL queries from pre-
established statements and the addition of the key-value pairs received from the ISA. 
The DBPS Child queries each of the data sources individually and attaches 
a binary security label to each of the returned result sets based on the classification level 
of the data source from which they were retrieved.  All of the result sets and their 
associated labels are packaged together into a single unit.  The unit begins with a 32-bit 
field indicating the number of result sets returned.  Following this is the binary security 
label of the first set, the 32-bit size of the set, and the set itself.  The result sets are kept in 
the form they were received by the DBPS from the external data source so that once they 
have been unpacked, they can be manipulated by the ISA as though the ISA had received 
them directly.  Additional sets follow immediately, security label first then the size of the 




Figure 8.   Response Results Format 
 
The security label is a 96-bit binary value indicating the security level, 
integrity level, and any compartmental information associated with the result sets.  Along 
with the potentially-large amount of data returned by each data source, the results unit 













can quickly become a very large amount of data.  Development of an efficient method of 
managing large amounts of networked data is presented as a topic for future work in 
Chapter VI. 
Then the DBPS sends the packaged results themselves as a Response 
Results message, utilizing the connection-based nature of the TCP/IP connection to 
ensure the message is transmitted completely.  Once the results have been sent, the DBPS 
Child closes the connection and terminates. 
D. PRE-IMPLEMENTATION MODIFICATIONS TO DESIGN 
Most of the processes and interfaces necessary to support data integration in 
MYSEA were developed as part of the design and implementation of remote applications 
in [14] and [4].  The Integration Stub Application operates identically to other remote 
applications and connects to the DBPS as a regular multilevel peer.  Because of this, 
there is little in the existing design that needs to be modified to incorporate data 
integration.  All that is required is to ensure that entries exist in the Peer Level Database 
and the Source Address Binding Database to indicate the necessary information required 
for the ISA to connect to the DBPS.  Since this project developed both the ISA and the 
DBPS to run on the same server, the current MYSEA server configuration already 
includes entries in the databases with the information required. 
E. OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
1. Newly Implemented Components 
The following processes were implemented specifically for demonstrating the 
support for data integration in MYSEA: 
o CGI Invocation Script for data integration 
The CGI Invocation Script is launched by the httpd process in response to a user 
request for the ISA remote application.  The script uses the Perl ‘backtick’ operator to launch 
the ISA and capture its output.  The script passes the key-value pairs input by the user to the 
ISA as command-line arguments. 
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o Integration Stub Application (ISA) 
The ISA runs as a remote application on the MYSEA server.  It is invoked 
through a CGI script from a web page and runs with the ID and at the current session 
level of the requesting user.  The ISA is an untrusted process. 
o Database Proxy Server (DBPS) Processes 
The DBPS Parent and Child processes are new trusted processes developed for 
this project.  The DBPS Parent runs as a system daemon and validates connection 
requests from ISAs.  If a requesting ISA is associated with a valid user session, a DBPS 
child is spawned to handle the request.  Otherwise the connection is dropped. 
The DBPS Child is spawned by the DBPS Parent to handle data requests from an 
ISA.  The DBPS Child is trusted to make queries to data sources of different levels and 
return the results to the requesting ISA. 
2. Modification to Existing Components 
No existing components required modification for this project. 
F. SUMMARY 
The design specifications summarized in this chapter provide a complete 
framework for data integration support as a remote application in MYSEA.  A prototype 
implementation based upon these requirements was completed for this project.  The 
implementation process is described in Chapter IV. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the implementation of a proof-of-concept prototype that 
was developed as part of the demonstration of MYSEA support for data integration 
applications.  The prototype is composed of a CGI invocation script, a simplified ISA and 
a simplified DBPS.  While some of the specific functionality of a fully-developed data 
integration system are absent, none of the missing functions would require additional 
process architecture of inter-process communication mechanisms.  The process 
organization and communication architecture required for data integration support has 
been completed with this project. 
Each of the following sections are presented with a diagram of the system 
processes involved in the data integration application to show the context in which the 
components are designed to function.  These figures are taken from the system-wide view 
of Figure 2 but are restricted to only the processes directly involved in data integration.  
Boxes with light shading indicate those which were developed for this project, and the 
darker-shaded box indicates the component currently being discussed. 
Appendix A provides a listing of MYSEA source code files that were created for 
this project. 
B.  DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
All of the code involved in this project was developed on an XTS-400 system 
running the STOP 6 operating system.  The ISA and DBPS processes were implemented 
in the C language and compiled using gcc 3.2.  The CGI script to invoke the ISA was 
written in Perl and executed using version 5.8.0 of the Perl interpreter.  Both the C 
compiler and Perl interpreter were the standard versions shipped with the XTS-400 
system.  This proof-of-concept data integration application was integrated into version 
1.1x of the MYSEA server software. 
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C. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
1. DBPS Process Functional Detail 
 
Figure 9.   DBPS Implementation Context 
To demonstrate a proof of concept for the DBPS processes it was sufficient to 
implement a single process which would perform the actions of both the DBPS Parent 
and DBPS Child processes.  The main consequence of such an implementation is that 
each request from an ISA must be completely processed and results returned before 
another request can be handled.  This is obviously inefficient for a production-level 
application, but is adequate for this demonstration.  In the case of the DBPS, the creation 
of child processes is simply a mechanism which allows for multiple requests to be 
handled in parallel and it is not a mechanism which requires additional privileges on the 
MYSEA server. 
To perform the functions of the Parent process, the DBPS prototype needed to 










1. The DBPS must initialize a “server socket” and enable it to listen for 
incoming connections.  This simply requires the use of the standard socket 
calls socket, bind, and listen.  The DBPS then enters a while loop and 
waits for incoming connections using the accept socket call. 
2. Once a connection has been received, the DBPS must verify that it is 
associated with a valid user session.  This involves a lookup to the Remote 
Connections Database.  First the DBPS initializes access to the database 
using the rem_conn_access function call.  Once access is established, the 
DBPS requests the session level information associated with the socket the 
requester is using by making a rem_con_get_user_session call; if the 
socket is associated with a valid user session then session level 
information is returned along with the result REM_CONN_FOUND.  If 
the REM_CONN_FOUND result is not found, the socket is not associated 
with a valid user session and the connection is dropped. 
At this point the DBPS Parent would spawn a child to handle the connection and 
return to listening for other requests.  The prototype continues with the DBPS Child 
functions. 
3. To make comparisons of the session level, the results from the Remote 
Connection Database must be converted into a string format using the 
HRL Database.  The DBPS initializes access to the HRL Database using 
the init_hrl_db_for_access call.  The DBPS then makes  a call to 
get_hrl_db_label, which returns the string equivalent of the session level 
information. 
4. At this point the DBPS should receive the parameters from the ISA which 
will be used to construct the database queries.  As noted below, however, 
use of integration of data sets was beyond the scope of this project, and 
static strings were used instead. 
5. The DBPS determines which results to use through string comparisons on 
the HRL label that was retrieved.  The results are copied into a buffer.  
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The DBPS then sends the size of the buffer to the ISA, followed by the 
contents of the buffer.  Having fulfilled the request, the DBPS returns to 
the top of the while loop and continues to listen for requests. 
2. ISA Process 
 
Figure 10.   ISA Implementation Context 
The Integration Stub Application (ISA) is the portion of the data integration 
system which requests data from the DBPS, integrates the results, and returned the 
integrated results to the user.  The development of a data integration function was out of 
the scope of this project and, at the time of this project, there was no readily-available 
open-source integration application to incorporate.  As such the ISA developed for this 
project is a simplified application which demonstrates the support for the necessary 
communications with the trusted DBPS from the user-level ISA.  The act of integrating 
the data requires no additional privileges on the MYSEA system and so its absence here 
is not significant. 
Because of the use of static strings used for results from the DBPS, the ISA 









The MYSEA support of communications t between the DBPS and the ISA are 
demonstrated sufficiently, and such additions are simply extensions of functionality. 
The ISA must perform the following actions: 
6. The ISA must use the MYSEA socket interface to receive access to the 
network interface card.  The ISA must first retrieve the handle to the 
MSKT database by making a usm_get_id function call.  Then access to the 
database is made with the mskt_access call.  This establishes access to use 
the necessary MYSEA socket calls.  The ISA functions require the use of 
mskt_socket, mskt_connect, mskt_read, and mskt_close. 
7. The ISA requests a connection to the DBPS with the mskt_connect call.  
This establishes a TCP/IP connection with the DBPS. 
8. Since the simplified ISA does not transmit parameters, it simply waits to 
receive the size of the data to be sent using the mskt_read call.  Once the 
size is received, the ISA uses a call to malloc to dynamically allocate the 
appropriate amount of memory to hold the results.  The ISA then receives 
the results from the DBPS and stores them in the allocated space. 
9. At this point the ISA should integrate the results.  Our simplified ISA 
prints the contents of the buffer to standard out, to be captured by the CGI 
invocation as described in the previous chapter. 







3. CGI Invocation Process 
 
Figure 11.   CGI Implementation Context 
The CGI Invocation script was developed to present the uses with access to the 
ISA remote application.  It is platform-neutral by design and can be accessed by any 
general web browser.  The invocation script presents the user with apropriate form fields 
for input of parameters for use by the ISA.  As parameters have not be utilized by the 
simplified ISA developed for this project, the CGI interface launches the ISA and 
displays the results automatically.  Examples of the output may be found in Appendix C. 
The ISA is launched by the backtick mechanism in Perl, which spawns the 
application as though it had been run from the command line and captures any output that 
the ISA writes to standard out.  Future implemention of parameter passing to the ISA 
requires only that fields be added to the form and that their values be appended to the 
backtick operation. 
D. SUMMARY 
The implementation of the components discussed in this chapter demonstrate 









of-concept application lacks some of the internal functionality of a full data integration 
application, it conforms to the design presented in Chapter III for secure communications 
in the MYSEA environment.  The next chapter describes preliminary testing performed 
















This chapter describes the plans for the preliminary tests which were performed 
on the proof-of-concept data integration application support.  Two systems were used 
during the testing of data integration support: a MYSEA server with proof-of-concept 
data integration components and a Windows XP client machine running a TPE 
implemented as a Java application and a web browser.  The MYSEA server was 
configured to have a single network interface which connected it to the MLS LAN on 
which the client was located.  The network interface of the MYSEA server was 
configured as maximum secrecy and integrity level 0 (denoted max:il0) for reasons 
discussed in [4].  The physical testing environment is depicted in Figure 12 below, with 
the logical configuration shown in Figure 13 
 
 
Figure 12.   Physical Test Network Topology 
Client Machine 





Figure 13.   Logical Test Environment 
The tests performed and the results of those tests are discussed at a general level 
in this chapter; specific test procedures and expected results are documented in Appendix 
C. 
B. TEST PLAN 
1. Overview 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the proof-of-concept application developed 
as a part of this project lacks much of the functionality that would be expected from a 
production level product.  The purpose of this application is to demonstrate that data 
integration can be successfully implemented in the MYSEA environment.  Inclusion of 
the missing functionality would not invalidate the design of these applications or their 
support in the current MYSEA configuration. 
Testing of an application such as that developed in this project falls into two 
categories: functional testing, which demonstrates that the components perform the 
expected functionality, and exception testing which, demonstrates that errors are handled 










functionality and the lack of user input limited the range of testing that could be 
performed on the proof-of-concept application.  The following two test cases were 
determined to be adequate given these limits. 
2. Test Suite 1 
Test Suite 1 verifies that a user receives the data appropriate to his current session 
level.  When an ISA establishes a connection with the DBPS on behalf of the user, the 
DBPS looks up the data which is at or below the user's current session level and returns 
these results to the ISA.  The DBPS compares the user's session level to the different 
possible session levels, and when a match is found a particular string denoting the 
consolidation of data at different levels is copied into the buffer which is returned to the 
ISA.  Additionally, the DBPS is designed to allow a record of each request, and the steps 
taken, to be entered into a log file. 
This process requires the DBPS to properly perform several functions internally.  
First it must retrieve the session level of the connection from the Remote Connection 
Database, then it must convert the level from binary form into a human-readable format 
using the HRL module, and finally it must use the converted label string to look up the 
hard-coded, unconsolidated data.  Error checking is not a part of this proof-of-concept 
application. 
The following table describes the test cases and the expected results of each test: 
Test ID User Session Expected Results 
a1 SIM_UNCLASSIFIED "No results" message 
a2 SIM_CONFIDENTIAL Confidential-level string 
a3 SIM_SECRET Secret-level string 
a4 SIM_PACIFIC_SECRET Coalition-Secret string 
a5 SIM_NATO_SECRET NATO-Secret string 
a6 COALITION_COMMAND NATO, Coalition, and Secret string 
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Test ID User Session Expected Results 
a7 SIM_TOP_SECRET Top Secret-level string 
Table 3.   Functional Testing 
3. Test Suite 2 
Test Suite 2 verifies that a rogue ISA executable will not be given access to the 
DBPS.  The lack of user input limits the possible exception cases which can be tested.  It 
was determined that since the DBPS listens on a port which might potentially be known 
or learned by a malicious entity, it is possible for a "rogue ISA" to attempt to make a 
connection to the DBPS.  For this test, a "rogue ISA" is any application which may 
attempt to connect to the DBPS on its listening port, and which may or may not attempt 
to communicate to the DBPS using the appropriate MYSEA 
The worst case scenario would be that such an attempt would result in a rogue 
ISA receiving a connection and some amount of data.  This should not be possible in any 
situation, as the DBPS has been designed with several levels of security verification.  A 
more likely case would result in the DBPS failing the lookup in the Remote Connection 
Database and then dropping the connection, which would at least present the opportunity 
for a denial of service attack, preventing legitimate requests from being serviced. 
For this test a modified ISA was compiled using the same gcc 3.2 compiler as the 
legitimate ISA, except using sockets instead of MYSEA sockets.  This rogue ISA was 
then run on the Windows client machine, demonstrating that a malicious user with a 
connection to the MLS LAN can not directly connect to the DBPS in order to bypass the 






Test ID Action Expected result 
b1 Connection from rogue ISA Dropped connection after a failed database 
lookup 
Table 4.   Rogue ISA Exception Test 
C. TEST RESULTS 
The testing presented in Test Suite 1 produced the expected results, demonstrating 
that the DBPS was performing as expected with the proper strings being returned and the 
proper entries being made in the log file.  There was no unexpected behavior. 
The results for the second test suite were also as expected.  A rogue ISA was able 
to establish a connection with the DBPS but was then dropped without receiving any data 
after a failed lookup in the Remote Connections Database.  While this does not result in a 
security violation, the process of querying the Remote Connections Database ties up 
resources and may potentially lead to a denial of service for legitimate requests.  The log 
file produced by the DBPS during testing confirms that the connection was accepted and 
a query made to the Remote Connections Database before the connection was determined 
to be invalid and dropped. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the testing performed to demonstrate the data integration 
support of the proof-of-concept application developed for this project.  All tests 
completed successfully. 
Chapter VI concludes this work with a project summary and potential future work 
based on the findings of this project. 
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This project has demonstrated the support of data integration in the MYSEA 
environment as a remote application.  To accomplish this demonstration, the project 
established an application design involving the use of an untrusted Integration 
Application contacting a trusted Database Proxy Server on behalf of the user.  This 
design involves the implementation of: 
1. The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) which is used to accept input from 
the user and invoke the ISA. 
2. The Integration Stub Application (ISA) which connects to the DBPS on 
behalf of the user, submits user-supplied parameters for the data queries 
made by the DBPS, and returns the integrated results of those queries to 
the user via the CGI script and the httpd. 
3. The Database Proxy Server (DBPS) Parent and Child processes, for 
accepting and servicing requests for data from ISAs by making queries to 
databases of differing security levels. 
Having determined a suitable design for data integration in the MYSEA 
environment, this project also developed a proof-of-concept application for these 
components and demonstrated their functionality through preliminary testing.  The 
application and tests demonstrate the support available in MYSEA for data integration 
applications. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THESIS QUESTIONS 
This project was prompted by two main questions: 
1. What modifications to the existing configuration are necessary to 
successfully implement data integration support on the MYSEA server? 
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2. What additional functionality is required to support the execution of data 
integration? 
In answer to the first question, it was determined that a new trusted process would 
need to be implemented in order to complete the tasks required for data integration and 
maintain the security policy of the MYSEA system.  Specifically, the need to send 
queries to data sources at different security levels necessitated the implementation of the 
Database Proxy Server.  This is because the act of querying a data source involves 
writing data to that data source in the form of a SQL query, which could be used to 
establish a covert data channel between the high DBPS and some low data source.  The 
DBPS must be trusted to ensure than information is not leaked through such a channel.  
With the addition of this trusted component, the rest of the MYSEA configuration 
remains unchanged. 
Regarding the second question concerning additional functionality that would be 
needed to implement data integration, it was determined that, with the DBPS in place, 
nothing else needed to be added to support data integration applications.  Building on the 
work in [4], this project was able to design a data integration application as a remote 
application, allowing the untrusted component of the data integration to run with the user 
ID and session level of the invoking user and request data from the trusted DBPS through 
the use of MYSEA sockets.  No complications were encountered during the development 
of this design or the proof of concept implementation. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. DBPS Child 
The current proof-of-concept implementation of the DBPS is missing 
functionality which would enhance the efficiency of the system and would be expected to 
be present in a production-level application.  One of these functionalities is the spawning 
of child processes to handle requests from ISAs associated with valid user sessions.  This 
functionality was determined to add extra complexity to the system without adding 
significantly to the demonstration of MYSEA's support for the application and so was left 
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out of the proof-of-concept implementation.  The communications between the parent 
and child processes, as well as the potential clean-up that these children may require, 
presents an interesting addition to the basic application and would provide useful work 
for future study. 
2. Data Base Connections 
Also missing from the current implementation of the DBPS is the ability to 
connect to back-end data sources which would be queried for data.  The current 
implementation of the DBPS does access pre-existing MYSEA databases through library 
interfaces; additional connections to other databases would not be prohibited by the 
MYSEA configuration.  The addition of external data sources would also require the 
implementation that accepted parameters from the user and passed them between the ISA 
and the DBPS. 
These additions add another layer of complexity and offer a range of acceptance 
and exception testing which was not covered in the current project.  In particular, user 
input would have to be checked to guard against attacks at several levels within the 
application, such as interactions with the backtick mechanism in the CGI, the 
communications between the ISA and DBPS, and the potential of SQL-injection attacks 
on the backend databases. 
3. Data Integration Functionality 
It was determined early that the complexity of handling actual data integration 
was too large to be handled as a part of this project.  Currently, there is no readily-
available open source data integration project that could be incorporated into the MYSEA 
environment, and building such functionality from the ground up would require 
additional study on the mechanisms and algorithms used in data integration.  There is 
added complexity when the discussion moves into the realm of multilevel data 
integration, including how to maintain security labels on data during and after the 
integration process, as well as concerns over the integrity of the data integration system 
itself. 
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4. Large Data Sets 
The purpose of data integration is to take similar data from multiple sources and 
use them to synthesize a more-complete view than any of the individual sources 
themselves would present.  The proof-of-concept application developed for this project 
handled small amounts of data, but it is given that a production-level application would 
deal with multiple data sets from multiple external sources, and that each of these data 
sets could be arbitrarily large quantities of data.  Additionally, as noted in Chapter IV, 
there is an amount of overhead required by the protocol between the DBPS and the ISA 
for each request and for each data set returned.  This presents the need for an method of 
efficiently handling large amounts of data to avoid bottlenecking and degradation of 
performance. 
5. Federated Server Environment 
The design of the DBPS and ISA is such that it readily lends itself to a federated 
environment, where the DBPS, ISA, and the backend data sources could all potentially 
reside on separate machines connected through the MLS LAN or over single-level 
networks.  This was intentional in that the true utility of data integration itself comes 
when the data sources in question are not under the direct control of the department or 
agency which runs that data integration application.  In such a situation the data 
integration application and data sources would almost surely reside on different machines 
and communicate over the network. 
As presented in [4], however, this sort of environment presents challenges 
particular to the current configuration of the MYSEA server.  Specifically, the SSS 
Parent process is designed to only accept connections from a user logged into the server 
via a TPE or from remote applications executing on the server which have been invoked 
by such a user.  The SSS checks the User and Remote Connection databases when it 
receives a request and drops the connection if no matching entry is found.  Currently 
these databases are local and are updated by other local trusted applications on the  
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MYSEA server.  As was shown in the testing of the data integration application, a 
connection from some outside source not in the local database will never reach the 
DBPS. 
One solution has already been addressed in previous work by Bui [20].  The 
specification presented in that work describes a “Single Sign-on” solution, utilizing an 
authentication server and an “application-mapping” server to handle user credentials and 
session levels and presents a protocol for allowing applications on separate servers to 
recognize all valid users.  Additional design work is needed for the system as a whole and 
to verify support for remote ISAs to contact a DBPS residing on another MYSEA server  
A re-evaluation of the problem of "rogue" ISAs is advisable for any such solution. 
6. Audit 
The current implementation of the DBPS enters a record of each request it 
receives and the steps it carries out.  The information provided in these logs has not been 
analyzed for usefulness or clarity and a study of what information should be logged and 
which can be left out would provide additional future work.  There is a need for the 
MYSEA server as a whole to be provided with a unified auditing functionality, and the 
addition of this functionality may provide the basis for an entire project itself. 
7. Further Testing 
Several of the functional additions listed above present specific needs for testing.  
Implementing user input and external data source connections present well-known 
vectors for malicious activity, such as SQL injection and exploitation of CGI 
mechanisms, as noted.  Implementing standard data integration functionality adds a level 
of complexity which requires its own testing to catch unintended behaviors and ensure 
that exceptional conditions are handled securely.  In addition to these concerns, a 
production-level implementation of data integration would require stress testing to 
determine whether and to what extent the processing encounters bottlenecks, and to 
determine ways of mitigating such occurrences. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
As more and more data is stored and manipulated through heterogeneous data 
sources there is a growing need for tools which aid in sharing and compiling related data 
which may be inconsistent or contradictory in order to get a full picture.  Data integration 
is a powerful tool to handle this problem, but its usability for government and military 
purposes is complicated and confounded by the necessity to integrate data at potentially 
different classification levels.  MYSEA is a project aimed at creating a distributed 
multilevel secure computing environment which lends itself well to the incorporation of 
data integration applications.  The demonstration of MYSEA support for data integration 
applications is another step towards a fully functional multilevel secure system. 
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APPENDIX A: SOURCE CODE LISTING 
This appendix provides a listing of the internal MYSEA source code files that 
were created for this project.  All the files listed are new to the MYSEA distribution and 
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APPENDIX B: INSTALLATION PROCEDURES 
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the installation of data integration 
support into the MYSEA environment.  Specifically, this entails compiling binaries for 
the DBPS and ISA, installing the CGI script used to invoke the ISA, and enabling the 
DBPS as a daemon and as a trusted process. 
The following instructions refer to the Secure Attention Key (SAK).  On the XTS-
400 console, this is enabled as the “alt” and “print screen” keys pressed simultaneously.  
In order to change security levels the user should issue a SAK followed by the sl 
command, and enter the desired security and integrity levels as prompted. 
The user should be logged in to the MYSEA server with the user ID of admin and 
the group ID of mysea for all of the steps presented.  
B. BUILD MYSEA BINARIES 
All of the object code and executables are pre-built and contained in the mysea.tar 
file.  Issuing the make_all.sh command during the normal MYSEA installation process 
will remove and regenerate all of the executables for the MYSEA environment, including 
those implemented during this project for data integration support.  The following 
instructions explain how to remove and regenerate these new components individually. 
(Set security and integrity levels – sl0:il3) 
SAK 
Enter command? run 
 










C. CONFIGURATION OF DBPS 
In order for the DBPS to be initialized to accept incoming requests from and ISA 
applications launched by users it must be enabled as a system daemon, to be launched as 
part of the system startup process.  This is accomplished using the daemon_edit program 
provided by the STOP 6 operating system.  The steps are as follows: 
(Set security and integrity levels – min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command? daemon_edit 
add 
dbps  For Daemon Name 
dbps  For Command Line 
<CR>  For Arguments 
<CR>  For Daemon Environment Setting 
Y  For Start Daemon at Startup 
Y  For High Integrity Program File 
N  For Control Device 
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max  For Security Level 
il0  For Integrity Level 
admin For Username 
mysea For Groupname 
N  For Display Current Order 
<CR>  For Daemon Start Index 
2  For Start Delay 
4  For Stop Delay 
Database Proxy Server For Description 
exit  To leave daemon_edit 
The DBPS must also be designated as a trusted process in order to perform it’s 
functionality.  This is accomplished using the tp_edit program provided by the STOP 
6 operating system using the steps that follow: 
(Set security and integrity levels - min:max) 
SAK 
Enter command?  tp_edit 
cd make sure in /system directory 
(The XTS 400 only allows high-integrity daemons to execute from the /system 
directory.) 
add 
dbps  For Program Name 
/usr/local/mysea/bin/dbps For Path Name 
<CR>  For Max Integrity 
<CR>  For Min Integrity 
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N  For Assign Privileges 
 Y  For Modify Discretionary Access 
 <CR>   For New Owner 
 <CR>  For New Group 
 rwx  For Owner 
 <CR>  For Username for Specific Permission 
 rwx  For Group 
 <CR>  For Groupname for Specific Permission 
 none  For Other  
exit  To Exit tp_edit 
D. SET UP CGI SCRIPT 
The CGI invocation script for the ISA must be placed in the web server’s cgi-bin 
directory.  The following steps should only be performed after the /home/http directory 
has been created and populated through the course of the normal MYSEA installation: 
(Set security and integrity levels – sl0:il3) 
SAK 
Enter command? run 
cp /usr/local/mysea/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
/home/http/cgi-bin/ 
chmod 555 /home/http/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
E. VERIFY INSTALLATION 
To verify that the data integration components have been properly installed and 
are running correctly, perform the tests outlined in Appendix C, Section B. 
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APPENDIX C: TESTING PROCEDURES 
A. PRECONDITIONS 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the test procedure used in the test plan 
presented in Chapter V.  The following precondition must be met before testing can 
begin: 
• The test network connecting the client machine to the MYSEA server is 
set up as illustrated in Chapter V. 
• The mdemo1 account exists on the MYSEA server with the default 
session level of sl1:il0 and a maximum session level of at least sl7:il0. 
(Following the standard MYSEA installation instructions will ensure this.) 
• The ccdemo account exists on the MYSEA server with the default and 
maximum session level of sl5:il0 with the sc1, sc2, and sc3 security 
compartments. (Following the standard MYSEA installation instructions 
will ensure this.) 
• The client machine has an installation of Cygwin, including the gcc and 
make packages.  A copy of the isa.c and associated Makefile should be 
placed in Cygwin's /tmp directory.  This directory will be found in 
C:\cygwin\tmp for a default installation of Cygwin. 
With these preconditions met testing can begin. 
 
B. TEST SUITE 1 
Log in to the MYSEA server from the client machine. 
1. Launch the Java TPE application by double-clicking the "tcbe" icon on the 
desktop. 
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2. Click the "SAR" button. 
3. At the login prompt, type "mdemo1" and press Enter. 
4. At the password prompt, type the password for mdemo1 and press Enter. 
The session level should be SIM_UNCLASSIFIED.  To ensure this: 
5. Click the "SAR" button 
6. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
7. Type "SIM_UNCLASSIFIED" and press enter. 
To access the web interfaces, a session must be established. 
8. Click the "SAR" button. 
9. Type "run" and press Enter. 
Navigate to the data integration remote application invocation page 
10. Open a web browser by double-clicking on the "Internet Explorer" icon on 
the desktop. 
11. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
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Figure 14.   SIM_UNCLASSIFIED Test Results 
Repeat the test for the SIM_CONFIDENTIAL security level. 
12. Click the "SAR" button 
13. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
14. Type "SIM_CONFIDENTIAL" and press enter. 
15. Click the "SAR" button. 
16. Type "run" and press Enter. 
17. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
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Figure 15.   SIM_CONFIDENTIAL Test Results 
Repeat the test for the SIM_SECRET security level. 
18. Click the "SAR" button 
19. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
20. Type "SIM_SECRET" and press enter. 
21. Click the "SAR" button. 
22. Type "run" and press Enter. 
23. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
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Figure 16.   SIM_SECRET Test Results 
Repeat the test for the SIM_TOP_SECRET security level. 
24. Click the "SAR" button 
25. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
26. Type "SIM_TOP_SECRET" and press enter. 
27. Click the "SAR" button. 
28. Type "run" and press Enter. 
29. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
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Figure 17.   SIM_TOP_SECRET Test Results 
In order to test for SIM_NATO_SECRET, SIM_PACIFIC SECRET, and 
COALITION_COMMAND security levels, we must switch to the ccdemo user. 
30. Click the "SAR" button. 
31. Type "logout" and press Enter 
32. Click the "SAR" button. 
33. At the login prompt, type "ccdemo" and press Enter. 
34. At the password prompt, type the password for ccdemo and press Enter. 
Repeat the test for the SIM_NATO_SECRET security level. 
35. Click the "SAR" button 
36. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
37. Type "SIM_NATO_SECRET" and press enter. 
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38. Click the "SAR" button. 
39. Type "run" and press Enter. 
40. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
 
Figure 18.   SIM_NATO_SECRET Test Results 
Repeat the test for the SIM_PACIFIC_SECRET security level. 
41. Click the "SAR" button 
42. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
43. Type "SIM_PACIFIC_SECRET" and press enter. 
44. Click the "SAR" button. 
45. Type "run" and press Enter. 
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46. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
 
Figure 19.   SIM_PACIFIC_SECRET Test Results 
Repeat the test for the COALITION_COMMAND security level. 
47. Click the "SAR" button 
48. Type "sl" and press Enter. 
49. Type "COALITION_COMMAND" and press enter. 
50. Click the "SAR" button. 
51. Type "run" and press Enter. 
52. Navigate to the application invocation page by typing 
http://192.168.0.130/cgi-bin/data_integration.cgi 
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in the "Address" field of the web browser. 
The page should display the following: 
 
Figure 20.   COALITION_COMMAND Test Results 
C. TEST SUITE 2 
Test Suite 2 is intended to demonstrate that a 'rogue' ISA process, as described in 
Chapter V, Section B.2, can not make a successful connection to the DBPS and receive 
data.   
The client machine has a 'rogue' ISA application which uses standard socket calls 
instead of MYSEA socket calls to connect directly to the DBPS's listening port.  A rogue 
ISA can be created with the isa.c and Makefile files with these steps: 
1. Launch Cygwin my double-clicking the Cygwin icon on the desktop. 
2. Type "cd /tmp" and press Enter. 
3. Type "make rogue" and press Enter 
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Run the rogue ISA: 
4. In the Cygwin window, type "./rogue_isa 192.168.0.130" and 
hit enter. 
The command will run but should hang.  Hit ctrl-c to end the process.  The DBPS 
log should indicate that a connection was made, no entry was found in the Remote 
Connections database, and the connection was dropped.  To view the DBPS log you must 
log into the MYSEA server console with the username admin, the groupname mysea, and 
the session level set to max:il0.  After logging in: 
5. Press the Secure Attention Key (SAR) 
6. Type "run" and hit enter. 
7. Type cat /tmp/dbps.log and hit enter. 
8.  The last lines of the log should look like the following (the process ID 
will probably be different): 
 27109:In while loop. 
 27109:Connection accepted. 
 27109:Checking security. 
 27109:Connected to Remote Connection DB. 
 27109:Disconnected from Remote Connection DB. 
 27109:Invalid connection.  Connection dropped. 
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